από jianniskys » Παρ Ιούλ 15, 2011 1:17 am
Επειδή εξω απο το χορό πολλά τραγούδια λέγονται και επειδή προσωπικά πιστεύω οτι η απαγόρευση των αγωνιστικών απο τους Ελληνικούς αλλα και άλλων χωρών αγώνες ειναι μεγάλο λαθος(θεωρείτε ασφαλέστερο να πετάξω με ένα δανεικό πανί που θα πρωτοπιάσω στα χέρια μου στην Έδεσσα?) παραθέτω το παρακάτω κείμενο που όχι μόνο με εκφράζει απόλυτα αλλά εξηγεί λογικά τις αιτίες των τραγικών ατυχημάτων εδώ στην Piedrahita.
Γραμμένο απο ανθρώπους που πετάνε, εζησαν τα γεγονότα απο κοντά και που προσπάθησαν να δώσουν πραγματικές λύσεις στα όντως μεγάλα προβλήματα που ανέκυψαν και όχι απο καρεκλοκένταυρους που ενώ επέβαλλαν την αγορά νέων εξοπλισμών όχι μόνο ανέραισαν τις αποτυχημένες αποφάσεις τους μετά τα ατυχήματα και σταμάτησαν τον αγώνα που έγινε με τα δικα τους νέα μέτρα,αλλά βιάστηκαν να ρίξουν τις ευθύνες στα αγωνιστικά αλεξίπτωτα όταν καμμία έρευνα δεν έχει ολοκληρωθεί και καταλήξει ακόμα σε κάποιο συγκεκριμένο συμπέρασμα, συμπαρασύροντας σε βιαστικές αποφάσεις και πολλούς άλλους.
Dear FAI/CIVL President and fellow CIVL delegates, I write to you now not only as the CIVL delegate for Luxembourg, but as a 747-400 airline captain with 36 years of aviation experience in an industry that has become the benchmark for industrial safety. As a pilot representative, I have studied and have taken courses in commercial accident investigation, and I can state with some authority that avoiding assumptions and speculation is fundamental to this field. No investigator would venture a conclusion as to the cause of an accident until every possible detail had been gathered and examined thoroughly. The reason for this is that very often the underlying cause of an accident is not necessarily the most obvious one. Accidents are not generally the result of a single element, but rather of a series of contributing factors, and in both Piedrahita, and Valle de Bravo, this was most certainly the case. As a result of recent events, the sport of paragliding finds itself in crisis. The decision we delegates make in the coming days with reference to open class gliders in competition events will have a significant impact-not only on manufacturers, or event organizers, or on hundreds of individual pilots, but on the very future of our sport (which has recently experienced remarkable technological advances as a direct result of the open class venue). Our decision must not be made in an impulsive, emotional way based on opinion, conjecture, and hearsay-or for that matter, on the recommendation of CIVL's president, or because his recommendation places us under legal pressure to do so. Before choosing our next course, let us be given, and let us look at the facts-as many as possible-and let us make certain we have given objective consideration to all the relevant arguments. We owe this to the pilots who died in Piedrahita, and Valle de Bravo, and to those who may put themselves at further risk in future competitions. It would be unforgivable to come to a decision now in haste and under pressure, only to discover later, when confronted by more deaths, that we had not looked at the matter closely enough. Are we absolutely convinced the problem lies with the gliders? What if we find that with serial class we have just as many accidents? There are still many questions left unanswered, and so far, we have been given very little information with which to make a decision. It would be helpful to know, for example, why the FAI/CIVL leadership didn't suspend all competition until a thorough investigation had been conducted. Why did it only suspend open class gliders in category one events? Is it that the FAI/CIVL leadership is convinced the problem lies with these gliders? If we do indeed suspend these gliders, may we then continue our competitions, using the same unchanged format as before (i.e. race-to-goal) with a clear conscience? If so, will it please share with us the evidence upon which it bases this conclusion? What reports has it gathered concerning the accidents? How many deaths have there been in competitions? How many deaths have occurred in cross-country events, or race-to-goal events? How many of these were related to open class gliders? How many were related to serial class? What data is CIVL using to form its conclusions? Before we can make a responsible decision we must be given the facts, otherwise, we will simply be reacting impulsively. I have been paragliding since 1990. I have been competing in both the cross-country and race to goal formats since 2005. On average, since 2007, I have been flying 200 hours a year. As a result of my job, I have had the privilege of flying over 300 sites in 30 countries. I have attended both SIV and acro courses and have stalled open class gliders. In 21 years of paragliding I have not had to throw a reserve parachute (though I have done so as part of my safety training). I have logged 243 hours on two-liner gliders, and this season alone, I have flown over 2,500 kilometers on these gliders in some of the most demanding regions of the planet--De Aar, Fiesch, Piedrahita, Valle de Bravo. I participated at the 2009, and 2011, World Paragliding Championships-both venues in which pilots died. Finally, since February, 2010, I have been an active member of the OCTWG, the CIVL working group tasked with finding ways of improving the safety of open class gliders in category one events. With this in mind, I believe I am competent to offer the following observations and suggestions. In its recommendations to the 2011 plenary meeting in Lausanne, the OCTWG made very clear its conclusions with regards safety at category one events. After analyzing the history of such events, and after countless meetings with manufacturers, competition pilots, team leaders, event organizers, and testing-agencies, it concluded that the gliders (either serial or open class) are not the primary cause of accidents. Of far more significance is the mental state of the pilot who, as a result of the competition format, has repeatedly demonstrated that he is prepared to take unacceptable levels of risk in order to gain advantage (or to not be disadvantaged) vis-à-vis other competitors. In the days following the accidents in Piedrahita, the participants (amongst whom were leading manufacturer-designer-test pilots, team leaders, and arguably, many of the world's top ranking pilots) were asked to work out a proposal, to be presented to CIVL, that would radically improve the safety level of the competition. After two very long days, and a great deal of discussion, some very interesting conclusions were drawn. To begin with, the vast majority of pilots did not believe their gliders to be the problem. Indeed, many expressed the view that the current gliders were some of the safest and most stable wings they had ever flown. If there was a danger in flying such gliders, it was precisely because they are so deceptively easy to fly; as a result, a pilot may become complacent and push more than he might otherwise do on a less stable glider. This observation is corroborated by one of the reserve deployments: On final glide, while applying full speed-bar, in turbulent conditions, the pilot (relatively new to competition flying and without much experience on two-line gliders) felt so confident that he entirely removed his hands from the controls in order to adjust his cockpit. Complacency is a human error, not a structural one. This brings us to another important observation. Unlike the PWC, which has very stringent requirements for pilot participation (and a vastly superior safety record) category one events tend to pit top-level pilots against those with considerably lower ranking. Not wishing to be at a disadvantage, there is pressure on the less skilled to compete with gliders they may not necessarily be competent to fly. The suggestion was made that either the selection process should be more demanding, or the World's should become a serial class only event--leaving venues such as the PWC to conduct open class competitions. The fact that not everyone is competent to fly open class gliders does not mean they should be banned from competitions. With this in mind, the group quickly focused its attention on what it perceived as the most significant hazard to safety-the racing format itself. What are the safety implications of a race-to-goal, a cross-country, or an elapsed time task? Considered by far the most hazardous is the race-to-goal format. It is also the task of choice for most comp pilots, and the one most used. It doesn't take long to determine its weaknesses. * The start: 150 plus pilots jockeying for position, generally in a confined area, possibly in very strong, or very weak conditions, waiting (often for at least an hour) for the start cylinder to open--this is arguably some of the most demanding flying a pilot will ever experience. The pressure to remain in a strategic position can be so great that pilots will fly into areas, and in conditions, they might otherwise never consider flying in.* En route: The desire to remain with the leading pilots, whose lead may be increasing, can be so great, that pilots, especially, those who, based on their performance from previous tasks, may experience even greater than normal pressure not to be left behind. In these circumstances, pilots have demonstrated their willingness to fly into the lee of mountains, or into forested areas with no land-out possibilities, or beneath overdeveloping convective clouds, rather than lose sight of the lead gaggle.* Final glide: Since arriving seconds ahead or behind a group of pilots can mean the difference between a very good, or a mediocre finish, the pressure to push the glider to its absolute limits for as long as possible, even when at lower altitudes, means that this is an area of very high risk. Moreover, once the end-of-speed section has been reached, many pilots may then find themselves converging into a congested area, trying to land in goal at a time of day that is most thermically active. Considering the difficulties surrounding a race-to-goal task, the group initially proposed implementing a modified XC Open type format. It soon became evident that this type of task had its own peculiar safety considerations (i.e. difficulties for the organizers to monitor flying conditions over an extended area, and of course, problems with pilot fatigue and retrieval). In the end, it is noteworthy that the group suggested a type of modified elapsed time format. In this case the idea was to chose a task that would focus more on individual technical flying skills (as opposed to speed), and one which implemented restrictions that would discourage the use of speed bar below a given altitude while on final glide. Due to its nature, the pilot would not be forced to launch at a specified time, but would be left to choose what he felt would be the most suitable time to fly. Furthermore, simply because another pilot was further along the course, it would not mean that that pilot was further ahead--thus relieving the pressure a pilot might feel to catch up at all costs. I won't go into greater detail surrounding the group's final proposal as this is not the place for it. What is important is that most were convinced that the class of glider flown was irrelevant compared to the racing environment that influences a pilot's willingness to take unacceptable levels of risk. One pilot put it fittingly when he said, "if you make a task asking a pilot to fly to the gates of hell, he'll do it!" (to that, I would only add the words, "on speed-bar"). After all of our efforts in Piedrahita, I must admit that when I heard that the competition was over, I was relieved. This was the correct decision. When people die at a sporting event, it would be unconscionable to continue competing until such time as a thorough investigation had been conducted and the underlying cause had been identified and addressed. With all of my experience in aviation, with my knowledge of safety and accident investigation, and with the many years I have dedicated to paragliding, I can honestly say that sanctioning future competitions while at the same time suspending open class gliders without first having conducted an exhaustive investigation is at best a serious mistake, and at worst, grossly negligent and may expose this organization to legal repercussions. The FAI/CIVL should introduce a moratorium on all competitions until such time as it has concluded a thorough investigation into this matter. If at the end of such an investigation it finds that open class gliders pose an eminent threat to the safety of such events, then Luxembourg will endorse this suspension. Doing so without first establishing evidence, while at the same time not looking into the concerns voiced by our sport's top-level competitors, or for that matter the recommendations of its own working group, is leaving the door open for further tragedy. Remember, in accident investigation, the underlying cause of an accident, is not necessarily the most obvious one. Sincerely, Gregory Knudson FAI/CIVL Delegate for Luxembourg